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Policy  
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Abstract This article seeks to explain why and how political parties adopt more 
restrictive migration policy positions by using Paul Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF). While a number of studies have focused almost exclusively on 
electoral factors to explain this anti-immigration turn, this article argues that policies 
and cooperation constraints with organised interests for purposes of coalition 
maintenance are also fundamental factors to understand change in party positions. 
Using the Swiss case as an empirical application, the article first shows how an 
increasingly anti-immigration policy discourse by parties has been triggered by a series 
of exogenous shocks (economic crisis, European integration and changes in partisan 
power relationships). Within advocacy coalitions, parties have sought to accommodate 
changing voter preferences with longstanding connections with organised interests. 
Centre-right parties have turned to an ever more restrictive stance on selective aspects 
of immigration policy (third country migration, asylum, access to citizenship) without 
challenging high levels of EU labour migration so central for employers. Social 
Democrats, for their part, have had to negotiate between the preferences of their 
middle–class voters keen on multiculturalism and those of trade unions whose base 
has become increasingly opposed to migration. 
Keywords: Migration Policy, Advocacy Coalition Framework, Parties, Social-
Democrats, Liberals, Switzerland.  
Word count: 7380 words with abstract 
 
Introduction 
There is now substantial empirical evidence showing that mainstream political 
parties in Western Europe have advocated ever more restrictive migration 
policies over the last three decades (Alonso & Da Fonseca 2012: 875). This “anti-
immigration turn” has affected parties on the right (Bale 2003), but also on the 
left (Bale et al. 2010). If the outcome of this change in policy positions has been 
extensively documented, however, its causes and the processes leading to it remain 
unclear. As to causes, while this phenomenon has often been explained by party 
competition and the “contagion” effect of radical right parties (Van Spanje 2010), 
recent research has tended to downplay this element as the sole explanatory 
factor (Akkerman 2012; Alonso & Da Fonseca 2012). Bale and Partos (this 
volume) show for instance that the British Conservatives have advocated more 
restrictive immigration policies before the emergence of a credible electoral threat 
on their right, such as the UK Independence Party. As to processes, a major 
question is how political parties reconcile a more restrictive stance on 
immigration with the interests of their policy allies (Bale 2008: 324; Bale et al. 
2010: 413-414; Karol 2009). For instance, how do political parties accommodate 
voters who are critical of immigration without alienating business interests on 
whom they depend for funding and expertise?  
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In contrast to analyses focusing exclusively on electoral factors to explain the 
anti-immigration turn, this article argues that policies and the relationships 
between parties and interest groups are important to understand how parties 
adapt their migration policy positions. Drawing on the case of Switzerland as an 
empirical example, it argues that an increasingly anti-immigration rhetoric in the 
discourse of mainstream political parties has – paradoxically – been triggered by 
an ever more liberal practice of migration policy, especially for EU workers. In 
this respect, the article connects this anti-immigration turn with the “policy gap” 
emphasised by a now large literature on immigration policy (Cornelius 2004). As 
it became ever more difficult to actually control labour migration flows, political 
parties have been prompted to show voters that they still had immigration under 
control by turning to a more restrictive stance on selective aspects of migration 
policy (asylum, citizenship, extra-EU migration), a tendency that has been 
bolstered by the strengthening a national-populist party, the SVP (Schweizerische 
Volkspartei). However, in spite of this more restrictive discourse, mainstream 
parties have not challenged the general thrust of labour market opening because 
of a set of cooperation constraints with their policy allies. Centre-right parties 
have sought to recover segments of their electorate tempted by the anti-
immigration rhetoric of the SVP without alienating business interests that are 
strongly supportive of free movement. Social-democrats have had to reconcile 
the constituency of trade unions feeling threatened by foreign labour with their 
middle-class electorate keen on multiculturalism.  
At the theoretical level, this article uses the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF) developed by Paul Sabatier and his collaborators (Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith 1999; Sabatier & Weible 2007) to understand how and why political parties 
adjust their belief system over time in the field of migration policy. The main 
added value of this approach is threefold. First, it brings in policy-oriented 
factors to explain change in belief systems, while existing analyses of the “anti-
immigration turn” have focused almost exclusively on electoral factors and vote-
seeking strategies. Second, while this strand of the literature has been largely 
party-centric, the concept of advocacy coalition makes it possible to consider the 
plurality of actors that intervene in party policy change, and notably organised 
interests (Karol 2009). Third, it seeks to analyse how changes in the policy 
positions of political actors (policy core beliefs) relate to their broader ideological 
agenda (deep core beliefs), or how immigration policy is connected to other 
policy areas. The article is structured as follows. The first section presents the 
ACF and how it can help explain change in belief systems in the field of 
immigration policy. After outlining some methodological issues, the empirical 
part of the article analyses the transformation of belief systems within the Swiss 
migration policy subsystem. The conclusion draws some implications for future 
research.  
Understanding Immigration Policy Change with the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework: Parties, Groups and Belief Systems  
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) developed and refined by Paul 
Sabatier and his collaborators is an analytical tool to understand policy change 
within policy subsystems over a period of a decade or more (Sabatier & Jenkins-
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Smith 1999; Sabatier & Weible 2007). In a nutshell, the ACF assumes that 
policymaking in a specific policy subsystem can be understood as a struggle for 
power between different coalitions of actors (advocacy coalitions) championing 
different visions (belief systems) about policy problems and their solutions 
(Sabatier & Weible 2007: 192). Advocacy coalitions are groups of actors from 
different spheres (e.g. parties, public officials, interest groups, academic experts, 
journalists) who share a common “belief system” and who maintain steady 
patterns of cooperation over time. The borders of coalitions can be relatively 
fuzzy and cooperation across members can be more or less formalised, but one 
defining factor is their pursuit of similar goals across time. The idea of coalition 
can be a useful analytical tool to understand across institutional channels and 
levels of government. 
Belief systems are constituted of three layers. First, deep core beliefs involve “very 
general normative and ontological assumptions about human nature” (Sabatier & 
Weible 2007: 194). Deep core beliefs can be understood as the deeply entrenched 
ideology that structures the preferences of actors in many policy domains, such 
as the left/right divide. Second, policy core beliefs include the definition of the 
basic problem in a policy subsystem, the ordering of policy objectives, the 
respective role of state and market in this domain, and the proper role of 
different actors in this subsystem. Finally, secondary beliefs essentially address 
instruments and modes of implementation of the policy core beliefs, such as 
budgetary rules or the timespan provided for policy outputs.  
An important characteristic of these different layers is their different degrees of 
resistance to change. While deep core beliefs are almost impossible to change 
(cases of radical ideological conversion are rather rare), policy core beliefs can 
only change as a result of a major exogenous shock, such as a major shift in 
public opinion, a change in the ruling coalition, or crisis. Secondary aspects, by 
contrast, are those on which (incremental) change and agreements across 
coalitions are the most likely.  
According to the initial version of the ACF, there are two major mechanisms 
whereby changes in belief systems can take place in a policy subsystem. The first 
is policy-oriented learning, or the adaptation of belief systems in the light of 
experience and new information on policy problems. Coalitions may 
incrementally change their belief system as a response to the effects of past 
policies on the actual problem to be solved (e.g. immigration flows) or their 
electoral effects (e.g the perception of a policy by voters). This type of mechanism 
is believed to affect the outer layers of belief systems only, because deep core 
beliefs act as important cognitive filters for new information: actors tend to 
dismiss evidence that does not fit with their deeper beliefs (Sabatier & Weible 
2007: 198). The other major mechanism of change is external perturbations and 
shocks, such as changes in socio-economic conditions, regime change, outputs 
from other policy subsystems, or disasters (Sabatier & Weible 2007: 198-199). 
External shocks are understood as the only channel whereby major changes in 
policy core beliefs can take place, notably because they redistribute resources 
among coalitions within a policy subsystem. 
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I argue that the ACF can provide useful insights as a heuristic tool to analyse 
migration policymaking, a field where this framework has, to my knowledge, 
only been applied once (Balch 2010). More precisely, I use it to emphasise the 
idea that parties seek to reconcile both electoral support and cooperation within 
coalitions in a policy subsystem. Here, I assume that maintaining cooperation in 
the face of a changing environment requires adjustments in belief systems for 
purposes of “coalition maintenance” (Karol 2009: 18). As argued above, most of 
the party politics literature assumes that political parties adjust their migration 
policy agendas as a response to electoral challenges only. They do not pay much 
attention to actual policy developments in this field, or to actors with whom 
parties cooperate or depend on. They largely ignore the fact that interest groups 
can be important actors influencing party policy, and that “much of politicians’ 
energies are devoted to keeping the groups that support them happy” (Karol 
2009: 35). For the purpose of this article, I stick to the main policy- and coalition-
centred assumptions of the ACF while paying attention to the specificities of 
electoral incentives.  
First, I assume that electoral factors alone are not sufficient to account for 
changes in belief systems. In the field of immigration policy, a major finding 
pointed out by scholars has been the significant difference between electoral 
discourse and actual policies. Hence, in spite of the anti-immigration preferences 
expressed by parties and public opinion, most industrial countries have failed to 
effectively reduce immigration flows (Cornelius 2004). In many respects, this 
makes interpretations focusing exclusively on vote-seeking strategies fairly 
unrealistic: if only votes count, most countries should have dramatically reduced 
immigration levels.  
Second, I argue that parties will seek to adjust their belief system in a way that 
reconciles electoral concerns with the need to maintain cooperation with other 
actors within coalitions, and particularly interest groups (Karol 2009). These 
cooperation constraints can act as triggers of immigration restriction, but more 
often as limits. Interest groups can push for more restrictions if immigration 
generates costs, but also temper attempts to restrict because of the economic 
benefits of migration.  
Third, I assume that these adjustments in belief systems will be subordinated to 
deep core beliefs in a relatively coherent manner. In other words, political actors 
will seek to maintain a certain degree of ideological coherence between their 
changing position in immigration policy (policy core beliefs) and the traditional 
values they advocate in other fields (deep core beliefs). If changes in parties’ 
policy positions (policy core beliefs) contradict their broader ideological values 
(core beliefs), voters and supporters may perceive these changes as opportunistic, 
and they may create internal dissent between “true believers” and 
“opportunists” within parties (Bale et al. 2010: 413-414). As to immigration 
policy, I will show how adaptation in immigration policy discourse has targeted 
specific aspects of immigration policy which do not challenge the core beliefs of 
coalitions. 
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Research Strategy, Methods and Data 
The empirical part of this paper is a case study analysis of advocacy coalitions 
and belief system change in the Swiss immigration policy subsystem across time. 
The case study format makes it possible to analyse the causes and processes of 
changes in belief systems over a longer period of time, something that is difficult 
to manage with a statistical analysis of many countries. Switzerland is an 
interesting case to analyse change in immigration policies because it has faced – 
early on and in an amplified manner – a set of constraints that most Western 
countries have had to deal with: high demand for foreign labour from the 
economy on the one hand, and widespread popular opposition to it on the other, 
the latter finding decisive institutional channels of expression through direct 
democracy. These constraints have made the need to maintain cooperation 
within coalitions of parties and interest groups particularly prominent, especially 
for right wing parties closely connected to employers. 
First, the Swiss economy has relied to a very important extent on foreign labour 
since the mid-19th century, and the proportion of immigrants in the workforce 
has been consistently among the highest in Europe since the second World War. 
With 24.7% in 2011, the proportion of foreign-born in Switzerland was higher 
than in any EU member state but Luxembourg, and was more than twice as high 
as the EU average (9.7%) (Vasileva 2012: 2). On the other hand, the institutions of 
direct democracy have provided institutional channels of expression for popular 
xenophobia not available elsewhere. Since the late 1960s, a number of popular 
initiatives have been started by fringe groups to limit immigration, thereby 
empowering early on anti-immigration groups which could be largely ignored 
elsewhere. At present, Switzerland notably features the biggest populist radical 
right party in Western Europe with respect to its electoral strength. The SVP 
(Schweizerische Volkspartei) gathered 28% in the 2011 national parliamentary 
elections, and has by far the biggest parliamentary representation in the lower 
chamber before the Social Democrats, the Free Democrats and the Christian 
Democrats.  
Methodologically, I proceed in a similar manner as Kübler (2007: 222). First, I 
defined a period of observation ranging from the immediate post-war period to 
2012. Second, I circumscribed the Swiss migration policy subsystem consisting of 
the actors (parties, interest groups, experts, bureaucrats) actively concerned with 
migration policy. Third, I constructed a matrix of belief systems following the 
three-tiered model of the ACF. Fourth, I identified clusters of actors acting 
together in line with these different belief systems, and fifth, identified changes 
in the power resources of these coalitions over time, and worked out alterations 
in their belief systems. I divided the period of observation into phases when 
major changes in power relationships occurred. The analysis relies primarily on 
newspaper reports, government reports, and responses to government 
consultations, party manifestos and secondary literature.  
Advocacy Coalitions in the Swiss Migration Policy Subsystem (1948-early 
1990s) 
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It is possible to identify three main advocacy coalitions in the Swiss immigration 
policy subsystem: a market-liberal, a nativist and a social-democratic coalition (Table 
1). The first of these coalitions, the market-liberal coalition, is composed of the Free 
Democrats (a liberal party that has been the only dominant political force in the 
Swiss party system) and Christian-Democratic party, employer associations (the 
Swiss Employer’s Union, Economiesuisse and the Swiss Union of Crafts) and the 
labour market bureaucracy at federal level (State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs). It advocates individual economic freedom and limited state intervention 
(deep core beliefs), an immigration policy primarily geared to satisfy the needs of 
the economy, and a limited role for the state in supplying welfare and integration 
for immigrants (policy core beliefs). This coalition is the one whose belief system 
has the most decisively shaped immigration policy in Switzerland for most of the 
post-war period. It remained essentially unchallenged between 1948, when the 
first bilateral recruitment agreement was signed with Italy, and 1963, when it had 
to concede a number of measures of immigration control to the two other 
coalitions (Piguet 2004: 14).  
The Swiss immigration policy regime between 1948 and 1963 clearly embodied 
the guiding principles of this belief system: an open admission policy catering for 
the economic needs of various sectors of the economy, particularly those 
requiring low-skilled and seasonal workers (construction, hotels, agriculture) 
combined with a restrictive immigrant policy, or limited social rights granted to 
migrant workers (Afonso 2007). Different temporary stay permits tied to 
employment and the absence of a compulsory unemployment insurance scheme 
ensured that foreign workers left the country if they lost their jobs, thereby 
making it possible to “export” unemployment (Fluckiger 1998: 371-372). The 
foundations of this model remained in place until the late 1980s, even if they 
underwent a number of major adjustments in the early 1960s. 
Table 1: Belief system of Advocacy Coalitions in Swiss Immigration policy 
 
Market-Liberal Nativist Social-Democratic 
Deep Core 
Beliefs 
Individual 
responsibility should 
be promoted and 
state intervention in 
the economy should 
be kept to a 
minimum. 
National identity 
should be preserved 
against foreign 
influences above all 
other considerations. 
The state should 
ensure social 
opportunities and 
equality for 
everybody. 
Policy Core 
Beliefs 
Migration policy 
should primarily be 
guided by the needs 
of the economy; 
immigrants are 
responsible for their 
own integration; the 
state has a minimal 
role. 
Immigration should 
be reduced to a 
minimum; 
immigrants allowed 
in the country should 
conform to local 
norms and rules; the 
state has no role in 
integration. 
Migration policy 
should be guided by 
humanitarian values, 
but not undermine 
equality and social 
protection within the 
country; the state 
assumes an active role 
in facilitating 
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integration. 
Secondary 
aspects 
Up to 1990s: 
migration policy 
should allow for the 
admission of both 
low-skilled and high-
skilled migrants 
1990s onwards: 
admission policy 
towards third 
countries should 
allow exclusively for 
the admission of 
high-skilled migrants  
Immigration quotas 
should allow for tight 
government control 
over who enters the 
country; access to 
citizenship should be 
subject to popular 
votes; foreigners 
committing criminal 
offences should be 
expelled 
International 
humanitarian 
commitments should 
prevail over national 
rules 
Coalition 
Members 
Liberal Party (FDP), 
Christian Democratic 
Party (CVP), 
employer 
associations, federal 
bureaucracy 
Small extreme-right 
parties (until 1990s), 
Swiss People’s Party 
(1990s onwards), 
Swiss Democrats  
Social-democratic 
Party, Green party, 
Trade Unions, civil 
society groups 
 
The second is a nativist coalition advocating the defence of national identity and 
restrictive rules in terms of immigration, integration and access to citizenship. 
This coalition emerged in the 1960s as a reaction against the massive increase in 
the number of foreign workers throughout the 1950s, and was essentially 
composed of fringe extreme-right groups, such as the National Action. From the 
early 1960s onwards, it used the channels of direct democracy, most notably 
popular initiatives, to fight what it perceived as the “over-foreignisation” 
(Überfremdung) of the country (Skenderovic 2009: 57). As the imposition of 
migration limitations from below would have had massive consequences for a 
booming economy and the interests of the market-liberal coalition (Piguet 2004: 
25), the government adopted a system of immigration quotas in the early 1960s, 
essentially as a way to show public opinion that it was keeping migration flows 
under control. Moreover, a number of other measures were adopted to 
accommodate the claims of the nativist coalition, such as the requirement for 
companies to prove that there was no Swiss worker available in applications for 
work permits. The quota system, however, would ultimately fail to stop the 
increase in immigration until the sudden economic recession of the 1970s. During 
this decade, the flexible immigration system outlined above allowed Switzerland 
to keep extremely low unemployment levels despite a drop in GDP. About 
300’00 jobs disappeared and 175’000 migrant workers were constrained to leave 
the country (Piguet 2004: 38). This mechanism allowed for a substantial level of 
policy stability within the subsystem until the late 1980s, mainly because the 
costs of economic change could be externalized on foreign workers. It must be 
noted that even if the nativist coalition had a substantial impact on immigration 
policy change in this period, it did not really challenge the cohesion of the liberal 
market coalition because it did not constitute a major electoral threat per se. 
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The third is a social-democratic coalition composed of the Social Democrats, the 
Green party, trade unions, and migrant rights associations advocating a generally 
humanitarian stance regarding immigrants, but also the defence of existing social 
conditions and wages. Hence, while trade unions traditionally tended to support 
the extension of migrant rights within the country, it was principally as a way to 
prevent foreign workers from being used to undercut Swiss wages and working 
conditions. Trade unions were generally supportive of immigrant quotas that 
could limit labour supply and enhance their position in collective bargaining 
(Flückiger 1992). This coalition has generally assumed a subordinate position in 
immigration policy-making, however. Trade unions, for instance, were typically 
side-lined in an immigration policymaking process which was dominated by 
employers (Cattacin 1987: 61). However, a number of its requests were 
introduced to prevent pressure on the labour market, such as the requirement 
that any work permit was conditioned on compliance with existing labour law 
and collective labour agreements (Afonso 2013: 140). The initiatives of the social-
democratic coalition to improve immigrant rights proved essentially 
unsuccessful, as testified notably by the failure of a popular initiative launched in 
the late 1970s to facilitate access to stable stay permits and abolish seasonal short-
term guest-worker permits (Piguet 2004: 40-41) 
As a whole, the Swiss migration policy subsystem from the early 1960s up to the 
1990s can be characterized by the enduring dominance of the market-liberal 
coalition combined with a number of elements designed to appease the two other 
coalitions: immigration quotas to limit the growth of the migrant population, and 
built-in measures to protect the interests of the core native workforce. Moreover, 
within the market-liberal and social-democratic coalitions, interest groups, rather 
than political parties, assumed a leadership position. Hence, the implementation 
of immigration policy essentially relied on a complex system of lobbying 
between employers and the bureaucracy with a weak involvement of Parliament 
(Cattacin 1987; Dhima 1991).  
Economic Crisis, European Integration and Party System Change: The 
Migration Policy Subsystem under Stress (1989-1999) 
The decade starting in the late 1980s can be considered as a period of change for 
the Swiss migration policy subsystem (Afonso 2007: 18; Piguet 2004: 47). Three 
interrelated exogenous shocks can be considered decisive to explain these 
changes: the increase in unemployment since the early 1990s, the increasing 
constraints of European integration, and important change in power 
relationships between political parties. While the “contagion” effect of the radical 
right can be considered important, the nature of strategic adjustments in belief 
systems can only be properly grasped in conjunction with the two other 
exogenous shocks. 
The first important exogenous shocks was the sudden deterioration of socio-
economic conditions that took place in the early 1990s (Afonso 2007). Starting in 
1991, Switzerland faced a long period of economic stagnation. Economic growth 
stayed below one percent for six consecutive years, and the number of 
unemployed increased from nearly zero in 1991 to 125’000 in 1993 (Fluckiger 
1998: 371). Even if unemployment stayed at moderate levels in comparative 
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terms, this shift was perceived as a landslide, and in many ways, revealed the 
hidden externalities of the existing migration policy regime (Afonso 2007). As 
they were on average low-skilled, migrant workers became greatly over-
represented among the unemployed (Afonso 2005: 654). In 2010, for instance, 
43% of the unemployed were foreigners, while they represented less than 25% of 
the workforce (Swiss Federal Statistics Office 2012). Unemployment could no 
longer be “exported” because a large proportion of migrant workers now had 
gained access to permanent stay permits. In many ways, this triggered a process 
of policy learning particularly within the market-liberal coalition. Hence, a 
number of economic analyses highlighted the hidden cost of the existing 
migration system which favoured structurally weak economic sectors in need of 
low-skilled workers, the latter being more likely to face periods of 
unemployment in times of recession (Dhima 1991). As the costs of this system 
now had become highly visible within the welfare system, a growing number of 
actors within the liberal-economic coalition, particularly employers in export-
oriented sectors, started advocating an admission policy targeting high-skilled 
migration only, and closing immigration channels for low-skilled migration from 
non-EU countries. This change of belief system was reflected by a series of policy 
changes providing for the progressive closure of entry for third-country nationals 
all over the 1990s (Afonso 2007). Interestingly, this movement of selective closure 
started when the national-populist SVP was still a relatively marginal political 
force, and was particularly pushed by employers rather than parties. 
The second exogenous shock was the European integration process, which 
prompted an opening of the Swiss labour market to EU workers, and the 
suppression of the measures introduced in the 1960s to appease the nativist 
coalition. Even if Switzerland has remained outside the European Union, the 
completion of the Single Market by 1992 prompted the Swiss government to 
negotiate a number of bilateral agreements with the European Union in order to 
secure access to EU markets. While the Swiss authorities hoped to maintain 
measures of immigration control, the EU imposed the opening of the Swiss 
labour market and the removal of immigration quotas as a condition for the 
conclusion of all bilateral agreements (Fischer et al. 2002). For the market-liberal 
coalition, the bilateral agreements were of vital importance to preserve the 
interests of the Swiss economy, and would ensure access to a large pool of skilled 
workers within EU countries.  
The social-democratic coalition, and particularly trade unions, asked for 
guarantees as to the protection of Swiss wages should the free movement of 
workers be established. In the face of the firm opposition of the nativist coalition 
to any sort of opening of the Swiss labour market, an agreement was struck 
between the market-liberal coalition and the social-democratic coalition about an 
opening of the Swiss labour market coupled with a reinforcement of measures to 
protect Swiss wages and working conditions. This agreement about 
“accompanying measures” to the free movement of workers was a way to 
reconcile the economic needs defended by the market-liberal coalition and some 
degree of protection for local wages and working conditions championed by the 
social-democratic coalition. This agreement was fought by the SVP in a number 
of referendums, first on its establishment with the EU15, then on its extension to 
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the EU10 after enlargement, on its extension to Romania and Bulgaria, and on its 
continuation after a period of evaluation. If in each of these occasions a majority 
of Swiss voters voted in favour of these agreements. However, these majorities 
were always relatively short, and showed the growing resonance of the belief 
system of the nativist coalition well beyond the electoral base of the Swiss 
People’s party, especially in a context were immigration was de facto being 
facilitated. 
The third exogenous shock has been the reconfiguration of the party system 
throughout the 1990s, with the steady weakening of centre-right parties and the 
emergence of the nativist Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei – SVP) 
as the biggest electoral force in the country. This development was closely 
connected to the previous one, as the electoral success of the SVP managed to 
mobilise the “losers” of internationalisation through its opposition to European 
integration and immigration (Kriesi & Trechsel 2008). In many ways, the 
strengthening of the SVP has made the nativist coalition penetrate the 
mainstream. While the fringe political groups which composed it in previous 
decades had never managed to constitute an electoral threat for established 
parties, the rise of the SVP exerted substantial pressure on centre-right parties. 
Throughout the 1990s, the Swiss People’s Party progressively emerged as the 
major political force in the Swiss political system (Skenderovic 2009; Vatter 2008: 
8-10). From 11.9% of the vote in 1991, the SVP increased its electoral strength to 
28.9% in 2007, the best score ever achieved by a Swiss political party since the 
introduction of proportional representation (Vatter 2008: 9). During the same 
period, the Liberal and Christian Democratic parties went from 21% and 18% to 
15.8% and 14.5% respectively (Kriesi & Trechsel 2008: 191). While it only 
represented about 20% of the electorate at the time, it was able to rally at least 
45% of voters on referendums on the free movement of workers (Engeli & Tresch 
2005).  
Adjustments in Belief Systems Within Market-Liberal and Social-Democratic 
Coalitions (1999-2012) 
In many ways, the combination of these exogenous shocks that emerged over the 
1990s triggered a number of strategic adjustments in belief systems within the 
market-liberal and the social-democratic coalitions, not the least because these 
shocks loosened the links between parties and their allies within coalitions. For 
centre-right parties, and particularly the FDP, it became increasingly difficult to 
reconcile their commitment to the free movement of workers, considered vital for 
the Swiss economy and employers, and the preferences of their voters tempted to 
defect to the Swiss People’s party. In the popular vote on the extension of free 
movement to A8 countries in 2005, for instance, analyses showed that one 
quarter of the traditional FDP electorate voted against the position of the party 
leadership, and instead rejected free movement as advocated by the SVP (Engeli 
& Tresch 2005). For Social-Democrats, the problem lay in the difficulty to 
reconcile an electorate of middle-class “socio-cultural professionals” keen on 
international integration and multi-culturalism on the one hand (Oesch & 
Rennwald 2010: 364), and the working class base of trade unions increasingly 
tempted to join the SVP as well. In 2007, the SVP gathered 39% and 40% of votes 
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among production and service workers respectively, while it represented 29% of 
the electorate as a whole (Oesch & Rennwald 2010: 354). As can be observed in 
other countries, the SVP has now become the party of choice for the working 
class  
The first substantial change in belief systems was the more restrictive stance 
adopted by centre-right parties regarding third-country migration, particularly 
on the side of the FDP. After the elections of 1999, when the SVP eventually 
outpolled the FDP for the first time, a change in belief systems has taken place 
within the FDP, who endorsed increasingly right-wing policy positions as a way 
to recover the ground lost to the SVP (Afonso 2013: 178-182; Akkerman 2012: 10-
11). This move was closely connected to changing power relationships within the 
party. Traditionally, the FDP had gathered a rather “moderate” wing with 
strongholds in French-speaking Switzerland and a more conservative wing 
particularly strong in German-speaking Switzerland. From the late 1990s, the 
more conservative strand of the FDP took the ascendency over centrist strands, 
and the party sought to recover the ground lost to the SVP while still maintaining 
its commitment to business circles and the free market (its deep core beliefs). In 
the field of migration policy, this was essentially done by adopting a 
differentiated approach EU labour migration on the one hand, and third-country 
migration, asylum and access to citizenship on the other. The opening of the 
labour market for EU workers was interpreted as a further justification to close 
down immigration channels for third countries. This tougher stance on third-
country migration and asylum was not considered particularly problematic for 
business circles, as high-skilled migration was still possible, and cuts in the 
asylum system also allowed for cuts in public spending. Hence, while a U-turn 
on the free movement would have been problematic in terms of core beliefs, 
restrictions in third country migration policy that allowed for cuts in state 
intervention could be accommodated without alienating business and employers. 
This move however, has not been fully followed by the Christian-Democrats. 
In the 2000s the FDP has often followed the more restrictive position advocated 
by the SVP on a number of secondary aspects, for instance by supporting a 
revision of the aliens law in 2005 which strengthened the ability of public 
authorities to detain foreigners, or an extension of the period during which 
foreigners can be locked up (Conseil Fédéral 2002). In a position paper issued just 
before the elections of October 2011, the party explicitly made a difference 
between the “useful” migrants from EU countries and migrants from third 
countries, whose numbers should be reduced to a minimum (Radicaux-Libéraux 
2011: 1). The measures proposed in this policy paper notably consisted in 
limitations on family reunification in order to restore control over migration 
flows, or enhanced sanctions against marriage fraud (Radicaux-Libéraux 2011: 4). 
Along a similar development, the new president of the FDP nominated in 2012 
was a prominent advocate of immigration control, and was notably the main 
proponent of a popular initiative voted on in 2000 aiming at limiting the migrant 
population to 18% (Forster 2012). In 2013, the FDP, CVP and SVP supported a 
revision of citizenship regulations which would make it more difficult to gain 
access to Swiss citizenship. 
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In spite of this more restrictive stance, the party has sought to preserve its policy 
core beliefs and its connections to business interests by keeping a commitment 
the free movement of workers with the EU. More recently, however, even some 
aspects of the free movement of workers with the EU have come under criticism 
within the FDP. The number of EU workers migrating to Switzerland had 
increased very substantially since the introduction of free movement: between 
2002 and 2010, the number of citizens of the EU27 increased by 260’000, reaching 
1’151’000 (Swiss Federal Statistics Office 2012). The party has notably been 
advocating shorter stay permits, limits on the ability of EU workers to claim 
unemployment benefits, and the continuous use of safeguard clauses to limit 
migration from Romania and Bulgaria (Radicaux-Libéraux 2011: 2-3). However, 
this increasingly anti-immigration stance and its persisting connections to 
business keen on foreign labour have put the party in a rather fragile equilibrium 
which does not seem to have stopped its electoral decline. 
The social-democratic coalition has been confronted with a different kind of 
trade-off: the difficulty to reconcile the pro-multiculturalism preferences of 
middle-class voters and those of blue-collar workers feeling threatened by 
migration. Historically, Swiss Social Democrats have been closely linked to trade 
unions. However, the electoral base of the Social Democrats has become less 
composed of blue collar and manual workers and increasingly of so-called socio-
cultural professionals (teachers, social workers, public sector employees, 
journalists, healthcare workers, etc.) (Oesch & Rennwald 2010: 347). On the one 
hand, socio-cultural professionals and public sector workers have adhered to an 
internationalist and culturally progressive agenda, while the trade union base 
has become ever more concerned with the cultural impacts of immigration. In 
other words, if trade unions have stayed the traditional allies of social democrats 
at the political level, the clientele they are supposed to represent have 
increasingly sided with the populist right. 
Until the late 2000s, the social-democratic coalition sought to maintain an agenda 
guided by humanitarian values. The social-democrats notably staunchly opposed 
a number of legislative reforms supported by the Liberal Democrats and the SVP 
geared to strengthen sanctions in the migration and asylum system. Over the 
decade, however, this position faced exhaustion. First, measures of restriction 
supported by right-wing parties have been systematically supported by a large 
majority of Swiss voters. New asylum and immigration laws which essentially 
provided for tougher sanctions and more restrictive admission criteria were all 
supported by more than 70% of voters in 1999 and 2006. Two popular initiatives 
launched by the SVP, on a ban on the construction of minarets and one on the 
deportation of criminal offenders were even accepted by a majority of voters 
despite the opposition of the centre-right and the left. In this context, engaging in 
referendum battles about immigration and asylum increasingly appeared as a 
dead end for the social democrats. In 2012, they eventually gave up on 
supporting a referendum against a new asylum law, arguing that another defeat 
was unavoidable and would ultimately weaken the party in this domain (Zeller 
2012). Second, the opening of the Swiss labour market to EU workers started in 
2002 had caused a significant influx of immigrants from EU countries which was 
causing pressure on the labour and housing markets, and the “flanking 
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measures” negotiated with the right and employers proved to be relatively 
ineffective in preventing abuse in wage standards. A report issued in 2011 
notably showed that 38% of foreign companies posting workers in Switzerland 
did not respect the minimum standards laid out in collective labour agreements 
(SECO 2011: 32). 
By the end of the decade, the pro-European and humanitarian position of the 
Social Democrats had been substantially toned down in the field of immigration 
policy. The party leadership issued a position paper in early 2012 which 
essentially emphasised the social, labour market and housing problems caused 
by immigration (Parti Socialiste Suisse 2012). The new president of the party 
argued that this theme could “not be left to the SVP” anymore, and that the party 
now advocated “regulated migration” instead of open borders (Graffenried & 
Pétignat 2012; Petignat 2012). It now admitted that deportations of asylum 
seekers committing criminal offences could be envisaged, and that the free 
movement of workers had only benefitted a minority. These problems were 
essentially framed as a consequence of the “failed fiscal and economic 
development policies of right-wing parties”. Employers attracted migrant 
workers without developing integration measures to accompany economic 
development, and opened the labour market without enough guarantees for the 
protection of local wages (Parti Socialiste Suisse 2012: 4). The party sought to 
frame this new policy position as subordinate to its “deep core beliefs”: the 
protection of wages and social protection. In many ways, this reorientation of the 
party agenda on the issue of immigration can be understood as an attempt to re-
conquer the working class vote that has increasingly moved towards the SVP. 
However, this change of policy generated a significant amount of controversy 
with the party, and was notably strongly criticised by French-speaking and youth 
sections, who denounced its alleged right-wing undertones (Matin 2012).  
Conclusion 
In this article, I have analysed change in belief systems within the Swiss 
immigration policy subsystem between the early 1990s and 2012. I have adopted 
an approach paying particular attention to contextual strategic factors, and 
particularly the need for parties to reconcile both electoral concerns and their 
links with other actors within a policy subsystem as determinants of belief 
system change. While electoral competition has been presented as the major 
factor influencing change in belief systems among mainstream parties, I have 
shown that electoral competition is only one component of the strategic context 
in which political parties change their belief systems in immigration policy. In 
many respects, this strategic context differs on the left and on the right, and the 
dilemmas analysed here are surely also present in other countries. For right-wing 
parties, the main dilemma has been to cope with the electoral threat of the radical 
right while sticking to a core belief system emphasising the free market as 
guiding policy principle. For social-democrats, it has consisted in the difficulty to 
reconcile core humanitarian beliefs with the preferences of blue-collar workers 
increasingly tempted by the radical right. While there has been a degree of 
convergence in belief systems both on the right and on the left, the justifications 
for these changes have been different, because they relied on different “core 
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beliefs”. Centre-right parties have sought to reconcile their commitment to 
market principles with enhanced control for third country nationals. Social-
Democrats have framed their more defensive migration policy agenda as a 
means to preserve the Swiss welfare model. 
The present article has pointed to three elements that should certainly be borne in 
mind in future research on political parties and immigration policy. First, vote-
seeking concerns are not the only driver of party policy change. Parties seek to 
balance vote-seeking strategies with other considerations influenced by existing 
policies and socio-economic conditions. Second, the analysis of party positions on 
immigration has almost completely ignored interest groups, while they do play 
an important role in the elaboration of party policies. Parties often depend on 
groups for funding, resources and expertise, and they seek to balance these 
relationships with vote-seeking strategies. Third, there may a substantial 
difference between what parties say (e.g in manifestos) and what parties do (the 
actual outputs of policy). This calls for a better integration of electoral politics 
and policymaking processes in the analysis of migration policies. 
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